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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
J. D. COLLIER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20653 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Deirdre A. Gorman, attorney for the defendant, is submitting 
this brief in accordance with Anders v. California/ 386 U.S. 738, 
87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 LEd.2c 493, (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639 
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). 
The defendant initiated this appeal pursuant to a writ of 
habeas corpus filed in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. In that habeas corpus writ, he outlined 
the issues which he wished to raise on appeal. These issues are 
as follows: 
1. A violation of trial court order that witnesses be 
excluded and not talk among themselves. 
2. Suppression of exculpatory evidence by the prosecutor. 
This evidence includes physical evidence, clothing worn by 
defendant, expended shell casings, evidence concerning the exact 
time when defendant was shot, evidence concerning the identity of 
the officer who shot the defendant, and failure to produce 
evidence as to findings of blood and urine samples taken from the 
defendant immediately after his arrest. 
3. The use of perjured testimony by the prosecutor. 
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4. Violations of the defendant's Sixth Amendment's right to 
confront and cross-examine confidential informants. 
5. Ineffective assistance of counsel based or the claim 
that defendant's counsel did not call certain witnesses for the 
defense and that defendant's counsel did not file any pre-trial 
motions. 
Fred Metos, defendant's counsel who was instrumental in 
obtaining this appeal, raised the following additional issue on,f 
appeal: 
6. The state's failure to prove the intent necessary to 
convict the defendant of attempted murder. 
An examination of the record on appeal reveals an issue 
raised by defense counsel at the time of trial, as follows: 
7. Evidence was admitted in state's case in chief 
concerning defendant's prior criminal record. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of a the verdict of guilty rendered by the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, sitting with a jury, on July 22nd, 
1981, The defendant was found guilty on two counts of attempted 
criminal homicide, attempted murder in the first degree. The 
defendant waived his time for sentencing and was sentenced on 
each count to a term in the Utah State Prison not less than five 
years and maybe for life, plus one year for the use of firearm to 
run consecutively. The sentences on the two counts were ordered 
to run concurrently. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the 8th day of May, 1981, the defendant, J.D. Collier, 
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was arraigned in Circuit Court on two charges oi attempted 
criminal homicide, murder in the first degree, in violation of 
§76-5-202(e), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended). The 
defendant was bound over at a preliminary hearing held on May 18, 
1981, and defendant entered a not guilty plea on May 22, 1981, in 
the District Court of Weber County, State of Utah. The defendant 
appeared for a jury trial before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde on 
July 20, 21 and 22, 1981. Defendant, at that trial, was 
represented by Maurice Richards of the Public Defender 
Association. 
Prior to the commencement of the trial on July 20, 1981, a 
conference was held in chambers at which time the following items 
were discussed. 
The prosecutor for the State of Utah stated that he intended 
to present evidence concerning two felony warrants that were 
outstanding on the defendant on May 7, 1981, evidence that he was 
an escapee from the Utah State Prison on that date and evidence 
that there was another outstanding warrant out of North Ogden on 
the same date. (R.110) The defendant's counsel strenuously 
objected to admitting any of this evidence, as it would 
constitute a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights 
under the Fifth Amendment. The defendant's counsel further 
stated that the defendant does not intend to testify, however, if 
the state introduced this evidence he would be forced to testify 
to explain the circumstances surrounding his felony status. 
(R.112 and 113) Counsel for defendant also objected to the 
admittance of the above described evidence or the basis that it 
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was improper under the then existing Utah Rules of Evidence in 
that it is impeaching the defendant's character before he brings 
character into issue. (R.lll and 339-344) The court overruled 
the defendant's objections and allowed the evidence to be 
presented to the jury. (R.117, 159, 354 and 374) 
The prosecutor, again in chambers, represented to the court 
that he intended to introduce evidence into trial, that a number 
of confidential informants had told various police officers that 
the defendant was in town, was using drugs, was dangerous and had 
said that he would not be taken alive. The state intended to 
introduce this evidence solely through the testimony of the 
police officers to whom the confidential informants had spoken 
and did not intend to either divulge the names of these 
informants, or call them to the stand. Defendant's counsel 
objected to the entry of any of this testimony into evidence on 
the grounds that it was hearsay, not within any of the exceptions 
of the hearsay rule, and furthermore, that it was violating the 
defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, which gives the defendant a right to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him. (R.118-121 and 124) 
The court again overruled the defendant's objection to this 
evidence and allowed it to be presented to the jury. (R.121, 
160-167, 274, and 275) At this time, defense counsel moved to 
exclude all witnesses from the courtroom and asked them to be 
instructed and not to discuss their testimony between themselves. 
(R.126 and 130) 
The jury was brought into the courtroom and the evidence was 
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presented to the jury as follows: On the afternoon of May 7, 
1981, police officers, acting in compliance to information 
received from confidential informants surrounded a mobile home 
located at 3860 Midland Drive, Roy, Utah. (R.256) Confidential 
informants had apparently told the officers that the defendant 
was located in this house, that he was using drugs, and that he 
was armed and dangerous. (R.160-167, 274, and 275) A number of 
police officers commenced a stake out of the house. (R. 256) 
These officers were mostly in unmarked vehicles and dressed in 
civilian clothing rather than in uniforms. (R.257, 259, 288, 
292, 378, and 597) The defendant testified that during this 
period of time he was using painkilling medication to treat the 
symptoms of some rotten teeth and he was counteracting the 
drowsiness these painkillers caused by using speed. (R.592) He 
testified that due to the combination of drugs which he was 
taking, he was in a wide awake drunken state. (R.594) 
At some point, the defendant and another individual left the 
house. They were pursued by two or three police officers, none 
of whom were in uniform and all of whom were carrying shot guns. 
(R.259 and 595) One of the officers, Officer Turner, followed 
the defendant, an individual by the name of Hansen and one other 
individual, for a short time. He then, without identifying 
himself as a police officer, told Hansen to stop. (R.285 and 
596) Hansen went down on the ground and the defendant took off 
running, thinking he was being set up for a robbery. (R.286) 
The defendant took off across the field and, at some point in 
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time, shots were fired in the defendant's direction. There is a 
discrepancy in the testimony concerning exactly when these 
initial shots were fired, however, they were fired either while 
the defendant was in the field or shortly after he ran up to a 
parked telephone company van. (R.598, 265, 689 and 692) The 
defendant entered the telephone van that was parked on the side 
of the road. Either before he got into the van or shortly 
thereafter, the tires of van were shot out by Officer Watts who * 
was shooting a shotgun loaded with double 00 buckshot. (R.187, 
206 and 5 98) At some point during the scenario, the defendant 
was wounded in the head by one of the shots from the officer's 
guns. Evidence is not clear exactly when the defendant was hit. 
(R.268, 407, 482 and 525) However, the defendant testified that 
he was hit shortly upon arriving at the van. (R.602) Shortly 
after the tires were shot out on the van, three canisters of tear 
gas were exploded in the van. (R.266, 350 and 602) At this 
point, both uniformed and civilian clothed officers began 
approaching the van, however, the defendant testified that he, at 
no time, saw any uniformed officers near the van. There is 
conflicting testimony as to conversations between the officers 
and the defendant while sitting in the van. Officers Watts and 
Lui testified that the defendant recognized the individuals as 
police officers and called them pigs. Officer Call, in his 
police report, had no mention of the word pig, however, testified 
later that he remembered that the defendant had said that. 
(R.692) The defendant himself testified that he, at no time, 
recognized the individuals were police officers until after he 
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had started the vehicle moving. There 5s further testimony that 
while the officers were chasing the defendant through the field 
and while they were surrounding the van, that the defendant had 
ample opportunity to shoot the officers but at no time took a 
shot. (R.348, 476 and 613) At some point, the defendant then 
started the van and, with some effort, began driving down the 
road in the van, which at that point had three flat tires. As 
the defendant proceeded in the van down the road toward a police 
road block, there was a number of shots fired both from the van 
as well as from the police officers at the defendant. (R.506 and 
327) At this time, the defendant shot several rounds in the 
vicinity of a couple of the officers. Officer Call testified 
that one of these shots actually hit him in the elbow. This 
wound was a very superficial wound requiring no medication. 
(R.466, 557 and 330) Officer Hammond then shot two rounds of 
double 00 buckshot through the front windshield of the van. 
(R.508) The van finally came to a halt, the police jumped in and 
pulled the defendant out, knocked the defendant to the concrete 
and discovered that the defendant had a wound on his head and was 
semi-conscious. (R.268, 337, 405 and 226) The defendant was 
then arrested, taken to the hospital for treatment of his wounds 
and was subsequently charged with the offenses of attempted 
criminal homicide. 
During the course of the trial, Officer Hammond testified 
that a blood test was taken of the defendant and that there were 
no traces of drugs or alcohol in the defendant's blood system and 
that there was a written report of this. (R.526) Officer Hammond 
-8-
was then recalled during defendant's case and testified that he 
had misstated himself and that there were no written reports of 
drugs or alcohol on the defendant, (R.686) 
During the prosecutor's questioning of Officer Lui, during 
which time the witness exclusion rule was in effect, Officer 
Lui's testimony suggested that he and Officer Watts had discussed 
Watt's testimony. While a witness on the stand, Officer Lui was 
asked: 
Q: Could you hear that response? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Was it directly responsive to the statement that you had 
made "Throw your gun down and come on out"? 
A: Yes, it was. 
Q: What was the response that you got at that time? 
A: Well, it was kind of a bad response. 
Q: The same response that Officer Watts testified to? 
A: Yes, it is. 
Q: Okay. 
Mr. Richards: I object to this. How did the witness know 
this unless he was out talking to Officer Watts? 
The Court: The objection is correct. 
Mr. Daines: I think it is too, Your Honor. 
At this point, the defendant's counsel, Mr. Richards 
requested that that witness be excused and not called. The 
court, however, allowed the continuation of his testimony. 
(R.310, 311) 
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At the conclusion of all the evidence, the jury retired, 
deliberated for approximately one hour and returned with a 
verdict of guilty to both counts. (R.713-715) The defendant 
waived his time for sentencing and was sentenced to a term in the 
Utah State Prison of not less than five years but maybe for life, 
plus one year for the use of a firearm. (R.69) 
The defendant personally filed a notice of appeal on May 1, 
1985, appealing this conviction. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Deirdre A. Gorman, attorney for defendant, is submitting 
this brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 
87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 LEd.2d 493, (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639 
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). Counsel's submission is therefore, that 
the issues raised by defendant are not substantive and probably 
do not warrant reversal of the conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DID VIOLATION OF THE COURT'S ORDER EXCLUDING 
WITNESSES CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom during a trial 
is addressed in §78-7-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended), 
which provides, in relevant part, "And in any cause, the court 
may, in it's discretion during the examination of a witness 
exclude any and all other witnesses in the cause." 
The exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom, pursuant to 
this section, has been addressed specifically in regards to 
criminal trials in several recent Supreme Court decisions. In 
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the case of State v. Carlson, 635 P.2a 72 (Utah 1981), the court 
was presented with a factual situation as follows. In this case 
the defendant was on trial for a charge of possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to distribute. The defense 
counsel moved, and the court granted, a motion excluding 
witnesses from the courtroom. During the course of the trial, 
several of the state's witnesses were overheard talking together 
with the prosecutor concerning various aspects of the case. 
Later in the case, some of these tainted witnesses were called to 
further testify and the defense attorney lodged an objection. 
The court overruled the objection and permitted the testimony of 
these witnesses to be presented to the jury. The Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court's decision,stating, "That it will not 
disturb any decision within the discretion of the trial court 
unless there is a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion." 
(Id at 74) 
See also, State v. Sanchez, 611 P.2c 721 (Utah 1980), where 
the court went even further in holding that "Unless some such 
good cause or justification appears, this interdiction should not 
prohibit counsel for either side from talking to the witnesses." 
(Id at 722.) 
In the present case, there is evidence in the transcript of 
several of the officers talking outside of the courtroom during 
the period of time that this order excluding witnesses was in 
effect. There is an also an assertion by the defendant in his 
writ of habeas corpus that the prosecutor was seen during the 
course of the trial talking to several of his witnesses during 
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the recesses or breaks. However, under the rulings of the recent 
cases cited above, such conduct would not constitute reversible 
error. 
POINT II 
DID THE PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO INTRODUCE 
CERTAIN EVIDENCE INTO TRIAL CONSTITUTE 
SUPPRESSION OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
SUFFICIENT TO FORK A REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION. 
The defendant in his writ of habeas corpus makes claims that 
the prosecutor suppressed exculpatory evidence. The items he 
refers to are articles of clothing worn by the defendant, 
expended shell casings, departmental shooting reports, a 
description of what type of gun each officer was using, failure 
to identify who shot the defendant, failure to identify when the 
defendant was shot, suppression of statements made by officers 
not testifying in trial and suppression of blood and urine 
toxicology statements. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Weather Ford v. 
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 51 LEd.2d 30, 97 S.Ct. 37, (1977), held 
"There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a 
criminal case." (Id at 559) 
The State of Utah has, however, provided certain rights of 
discovery in a criminal trial. In §77-35-16(a)(4), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 (as amended), there is a provision that the 
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense, upon request, material 
which includes, "evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the 
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defendant or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced 
punishment. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has further established a parameter 
of discovery rights under the United States Constitution. In the 
case of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 LEd.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 
1194, (1963), the Supreme Court stated, "We now hold that the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request, violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to the guilt or punishment irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." (1^ 3 at 87, emphasis 
added.) 
The U.S. Court of Appeals, in the case of U.S.. v. Mackin, 
569 F.2d 958 at 961 (C.A.D.C. 1977), held, "A new trial will not 
be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence unless that 
evidence would probably produce an acquittal upon retrial." 
The standard, therefore, applied in determining whether or 
not the suppression of evidence would warrant a reversal is 
whether that evidence is material, whether that evidence, if 
introduced at trial, would probably produce an acquittal upon 
retrial. In the present case, this standard is simply not met. 
In the present case, there was no question that the 
defendant was present and the defendant fire some shots out of a 
gun which he possessed. The empty shell cartridges and the 
articles of clothing that defendant wore, therefore, would not be 
material for the defense. Furthermore, there is no evidence that 
these items were suppressed since no request to produce these 
items was made during the course of the trial. The same 
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reasoning would apply as to a description as to caliber gun each 
of the officers fired. It was a definite issue at trial as to 
exactly who shot the defendant and when that shooting occurred. 
The state argued that the evidence pointed to the defendant being 
shot by Officer Hammond immediately before the van was brought to 
a halt. Counsel for the defense questioned several of the 
witnesses in an attempt to show that the defendant was shot 
earlier in the scenario, thereby rendering him incapable of 
formulating the requisite criminal intent. The failure of the 
prosecutor to establish exactly when he was shot, therefore, 
would be more detrimental to the state's case than it would be to 
the defense. 
There is no evidence in the record as to suppression of 
statements made by officers not testifying at trial. It appears 
from the transcript that the majority of the officers at the 
scene were put on the stand at one time or another. The 
defendant's claim that the police suppressed evidence regarding 
the blood and urine samples of the defendant again is negated by 
the trial transcript. During the state's case in chief, Officer 
Hammond testified that there was a blood test taken on the 
defendant but no traces of drug or alcohol were found in the 
defendant's system. The officer stated there were written 
reports from the hospital to this effect. Officer Hammond was 
recalled during defendant's case and corrected himself by 
testifying that actually no reports concerning the drug or 
alcohol content of the defendant at the time of the incident, 
were issued. This testimony does not appear to be a perjury 
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which might warrant a new tria] but a misstatement of facts which 
the officer corrected. The officer, in his testimony, was very 
clear that in his opinion the defendant acted as though he was 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol when they got him out of 
the car. The record does not reflect, in this instance, grounds 
for reversal on the basis that the prosecutor suppressed 
exculpatory evidence. 
POINT III 
WAS PERJURED TESTIMONY USED IN OBTAINING A 
CONVICTION ON DEFENDANT. 
The defendant in his writ of habeas corpus claimed that the 
prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony of two officers. He 
claims that Officer Hammond and Officer Call both committed 
perjury on the stand and this perjury was material in obtaining a 
conviction of the defendant. 
Officer Hammond, as stated above, testified that he had 
written results from a blood test of the defendant that should no 
alcohol or drug residue in the defendant's system at the time of 
the offense. During cross-examination, Officer Hammond was asked 
to bring in the written report. He later corrected himself by 
saying that there actually was no written report as to the drug 
or alcohol content of the defendant's blood. 
Officer Call testified as to some comments the defendant 
made during short conversations with the police during the period 
while he was under attack by the police. These went beyond what 
was contained in his police reports and this point was brought 
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out in cross-examination of the officer on pages 689-692 of the 
record on appeal. 
In both instances, it is arguable whether or not the 
witnesses intentionally committed perjury or whether they simply 
could not fully remember the facts during their testimony. In 
both cases, the discrepancies were brought out by defense counsel 
and in both cases, defense counsel made a point of the change of 
testimony. The cross-examination techniques of defense counsel, 
therefore, directly attacked the credibility of these two 
witnesses due to the discrepancies in their testimony. It can be 
argued either way that the prejudicial effect of these statements 
was successfully nullified. There is no way to know which is 
correct. It could be argued that catching the officers in clear 
misstatements might have benefited the defendant. In any event, 
the jury had these points clearly before it. 
POINT IV 
WERE THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION VIOLATED BY THE FAILURE 
TO LET HIM CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. 
During the state's case in chief, they called Officer Randy 
Watts to the stand to testify concerning the offense with which 
the defendant is charged. Officer Watts testified that an 
unnamed confidential informant informed him that the defendant 
was staying in the house, that he was armed and would not be 
taken alive. Officer Watts relied upon this information and 
surrounded the house where the defendant was eventually found. 
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Counsel for the defendant objected numerous times to the 
entry of this information into evidence on two grounds. First, 
that it was a violation of a hearsay rule, and second, that it 
was in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him. The court overruled 
defense objections and allowed the testimony into evidence. 
The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in the 
State of McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S.300, 18 LEd.2d 62, 87 S.Ct. 
1056, (1967). In that case, the Court was presented with a 
situation in which a confidential informant told the police 
officers that an individual had drugs on his person. The 
officers stopped the individual, searched him and found some 
drugs. The defendant moved to suppress evidence and during the 
suppression hearing requested the identity and presence of this 
confidential informant. The Court denied the motion, thereby 
allowing the anonymity of the confidential informant. In an 
appeal claiming that the defendant's rights under the Sixth 
Amendment were violated, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution does not give a defendant in a 
criminal trial the right to the identity of a confidential 
informant nor the right to cross-examine that informant 
concerning matters told to the police. 
In^the McCray decision, the Court stated in relevant part, 
"If the claim is that the state violated 
the Sixth Amendment by not producing the 
informer to testify against the petitioner, 
then we need no more than repeat the Court's 
answer to that claim a few weeks ago 
in Cooper v. California, 'Petitioner also 
presents contention here that he was 
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unconstitutionally deprived of the right 
to confront a witness against him because 
the state did not produce the informant to 
testify against him. This contention we 
consider absolutely devoid of merit.1 
On the other hand, the claim may be that 
the petitioner was deprived his Sixth 
Amendment right to cross-examine the 
arresting officers themselves because a 
refusal to reveal the informer's identity 
was upheld. It would follow from this 
argument that no witness on cross-examination 
could ever constitutionally assert a 
testimonial privilege, including the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination 
guaranteed by the constitution itself. We 
have never given the Sixth Amendment such 
a construction and we decline to do so now." 
(Id at 313 and 314) 
See also Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 17 LEd.2d 730, 
87 S.Ct. 788 (1967). 
The law, therefore, is clear that the defendant, in the 
present case, has no constitutional claim on this issue. 
POINT V 
WAS DEFENDANT INEFFECTIVELY REPRESENTED 
BY COUNSEL. 
The defendant, again in his writ of habeas corpus, requests 
that his conviction be reversed on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. His claims are based on the assertion 
that counsel did not call certain witnesses for his defense and 
that counsel did not present any pre-trial motions. 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of 
ineffective representation of counsel most recently in the case 
o f
 State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982). The Court, in that 
case, held "Trial tactics lie within the prerogative of counsel 
and may not be dictated by his client. Decisions as to what 
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witnesses to call, what objections to make, and by and large, 
what defenses to interpose are generally left to the professional 
judgment of counsel." (I_d at 91) 
The Utah Supreme Court has further held in the case of State 
v. Pierren, 583 P.2d 69 (Utah 1978) that, "To show inadequate or 
ineffective counsel, the record must establish that counsel was 
ignorant of the facts or the law resulting in withdrawal of a 
crucial defense reducing the trial to a 'farce and a sham1." (Id 
at 70-71) 
In the case at hand, there is no showing of such ignorance 
of facts or law. A careful reading of the trial transcript will 
show that counsel for the defendant throughout the trial was 
competent and, in some points, brilliant. His objections were 
timely, his cross-examination of state's witnesses was 
productive, and he had a thorough grasp of both the law and the 
facts of this particular case. 
The defendant further clctims that the defense counsel had a 
conflict of interest in that he represented one or a number of 
the state's witnesses. Since the state's witnesses were all 
police officers, it is quite unlikely, and there is no evidence 
in the record of such conflict. 
In any event, there is no evidence whatsoever in the record 
as to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
POINT VI 
DID THE DEFENDANT POSSESS THE INTENT NECESSARY 
TO CONVICT HIM OF ATTEMPTED MURDER. 
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§76-5-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended), defines 
murder in the first degree. §76-5-202(1) states, "Criminal 
homicide constitutes murder in tl le first deqree it the actor 
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under the 
following circumstances." {emphasis added) §76-4-101 defines 
the elements of an attempt, which wo;; .: /. the present 
case. 
Under these statutes, therefore, in order to find an 
individual guilty of this offense, it must hi- proved that he 
intentionally or knowingly attempted to cause the death of 
another. If no intent is proved, then the defendant must be 
found not guilty or, in the alternative, guilty of a lessor 
included offense. The determination of whether the defendant 
possessed this requisite criminal knowledge or intent is a 
determination that is to be made by the jury. Furthermore, under 
Utah law, a person must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of each element of the offense which would, in this case, 
include the element of knowing or intentional. §76-1-501, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended). 
The Supreme Court is generally hesitant to reverse a lower 
court's conviction of an individual on the basis of insufficient 
evidence. This reluctancy is expressed in State v. Newbold, 581 
P.2d 991 (Utah 1972), where the Court held, "To set aside a jury 
verdict, evidence must appear so inconclusive and unsatisfactory 
that reasonable minds acting fairly upon it must have entertained 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime." 
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A reversal of the verdict in the present case would require 
that evidence as to the defendant's knowledge or intent was 
totally inconclusive and unsatisfactory, or it would require a 
showing that the jury did not address that issue. In the present 
case, however, there is ample; evidence that the jury addressed 
this issue. The court instructed the jury in instructions number 
6, 11, 13, 14 and 15 that the crime charged is one* that required 
proof of specific intent before the defendant could be convicted. 
The jury, in this case, retired to deliberate after having been 
instructed by the judge of these intent requirements and, 
furthermore, they retired to the jury room with a copy of the 
jury instructions. The evidence as presented at trial could 
clearly support the finding of such intent. The record contains 
testimony supporting the state's contention that the defendant's 
an escaped felony, was trying to escape from the law officers and 
that he had a gun with him and, on two occasions tried to shoot 
the officers. Therefore, the requirement of inconclusiveness 
necessary for a reversal, cannot be found in this case. 
POINT VII 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE IT'S DISCRETION 
BY ALLOWING TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE DEFENDANT'S 
PRIOR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY INTO EVIDENCE. 
The defendant was brought to trial on these charges in July 
of 1981 and, at that time, the court was governed by the former 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states in relevant 
part that "Evidence of specific instances of conduct other than 
evidence of conviction of a crime which tends to prove the trait 
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to be bad shall be inadmissable" unless " the accused has 
introduced evidence of his good character." 
Rule 55 goes further to state 
"Subject to Rule 47, evidence that a person 
committed a crime or civil wrong on a 
specified occasion is inadmissable to prove 
his disposition to commit crime or civil 
wrong as the basis for the inference that 
he committed another crime or civil wrong 
on another specified occasion. But subject 
to Rules 45 and 4 8 such evidence is 
admissable when relevant to prove some 
other material fact, including absence of 
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or 
identity." 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed this issue in the case 
of State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978). In that case, the 
Court held, 
"this Court has stated on numerous occasions 
that evidence of other crimes allegedly 
committed by the defendant is not admissable 
if the purpose is to disgrace the defendant 
as a person of evil character with a 
propensity... to commit crime and thus likely 
to have committed the crime charged. However, 
if the evidence has relevency to explain 
circumstances surrounding the instant crime, 
it is admissable for that purpose and the 
fact that it may tend to connect a defendant 
with another crime will not render it incompetent." 
(.Id at 882) 
In the Daniels case, the Court affirmed the lower court's 
ruling admitting evidence of prior bad conduct on the basis that 
it was relevant to explain the circumstances surrounding the 
instant crime. 
See also State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d 783 (Utah 1977), where 
the court held, "Nevertheless if the evidence has relevance and 
probative value relating to his commission of the crime charged, 
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the fact that it shows commission of another crime does not 
render it incompetent." (Ijd at 786) 
In the present case, during the state's case in chief, 
evidence was presented through several of the state's witnesses 
concerning outstanding felony warrants against the defendants, 
and evidence concerning the fact that the defendant had recently 
escaped from the Utah State Prison. The court overruled defense 
counsel's objections that this evidence was inadmissable as part 
of the res gestae. Under the circumstances of the case, the 
decisions in State v. Daniels and State v. Gibson would be 
directly controlling concerning the admissability of the 
defendant's prior criminal record. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel for defendant asks that this Court make a full 
examination of the proceedings and then rule on counsel's motion 
to withdraw. 
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